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A TRIBUTE TO THOMAS E. McHUGH
L Liquidated Damages Clause
Justice McHugh wrote in Wheeling Clinic v. Van Pelt745 that
[i]n determining whether a clause in a contract stating a sum to be
paid in the event of a breach of the contract is liquidated damages
or a penalty, the important question is not the intention of the
parties but rather the reasonableness in fact of the agreed sum
when the contract was made.746
J. Promissory Note
Justice McHugh held in Young v. Soda ro74 that "[u]nder the rule of
perfect tender in time, a debtor, absent statutory authority or contractual language
to the contrary, has no right to prepay a promissory note secured by a deed of trust
prior to the date of maturity." 748
XIII. CIVIL RIGHTS
A. Judicial Review of Decision by Human Rights Commission
In State ex rel. State of West Virginia Human Rights Commission v.
Logan-Mingo Area Mental Health Agency, Inc.,749 Justice McHugh held:
A determination, by the West Virginia Human Rights
Commission, that an employer has accorded disparate treatment to
members of different races, is a finding of fact which may not be
reversed by a circuit court upon review, unless such finding is
clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative and substantial
evidence on the whole record.750
B. Sufficiency of Administrative Complaint
Justice McHugh addressed several issues concerning prerequisites of a
discrimination complaint filed with the Human Rights Commission in the case of
745 453 S.E.2d 603 (W. Va. 1994).
746 IR. at Syl. Pt. 5.
747 456 S.E.2d 31 (W. Va. 1995).
748 Id. at Syl.
749 329 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 1985).
750 ITM at Syl. Pt. 5.
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McJunkin Corp. v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission.5 Justice McHugh
held:
In an administrative adjudication before the West Virginia Human
Rights Commission, a complaint alleging a violation or violations
of the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W.Va. Code, 5-11-1 to
5-11-19, as amended, must be sufficient to advise the adversarial
party of the matters charged, and the charges must be adequately
clear and specific to allow preparation of a defense.752
Justice McHugh also stated:
An allegation of an illegal layoff contained in a complaint to the
West Virginia Human Rights Commission does not encompass an
allegation of an illegal failure to rehire where no allegation
relating to such failure to rehire is filed or where no amendment
regarding such failure is made to the complaint within 180 days
after the failure to rehire.75 3
Justice McHugh concluded:
Where an issue is not raised by the complainant in a complaint to
the West Virginia Human Rights Commission, the Commission's
hearing examiner is precluded from independently raising the
issue and deciding it on the merits where the respondent has not
received adequate notice of the issue in the form of a complaint or
an amendment thereto nor had an opportunity to defend his or her
position, provided that the issue not raised in the complaint or an
amendment thereto is not heard by the express or implied consent
of the parties. 7-4
C. Subpoena Authority of Human Rights Commission
Justice McHugh examined the subpoena power of the Human Rights
Commission in the case of West Virginia Human Rights Commission v. Moore.55
The decision held as follows:
A subpoena duces tecum, issued to an employer by the West
Virginia Human Rights Commission is enforceable even where
751 369 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1988).
752 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
753 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
754 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
755 411 S.E.2d 702 (W. Va. 1991).
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the complainantlemployee has signed a release waiving all claims
against the employer which might arise out of the employment
relationship, because the legislature has granted the Commission
the authority to investigate alleged discriminatory practices
pursuant to W.Va. Code, 5-11-10, as amended, and the authority to
issue a subpoena duces tecum pursuant to W.Va. Code,
5-11-8(d)(1), as amended. Additionally, the procedural
requirements of issuing such a subpoena duces tecum must have
been met and the evidence sought by the Commission must be
relevant and material to the investigation. 6
D. Definitions
Justice McHugh held in Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Department v.
State ex rel. State of West Virginia Human Rights Commission757 that
[a] volunteer fire department, organized and operated pursuant to
the laws of the State of West Virginia, and which receives funding
from public sources, is a "place of public accommodations" as
defined by W.Va. Code, 5-11-30) [1981], and is thereby subject to
the provisions of The West Virginia Human Rights Act, as
amended, W.Va. Code, 5-11-1 et seq.758
Justice McHugh stated in Board of Education of County of Lewis v. West
Virginia Human Rights Commission75 9 that "[a] county board of education is a
"person" pursuant to W.Va. Code, 5-11-3(a), as amended, and a "place of public
accommodations" pursuant to W.Va. Code, 5-11-3(j), as amended, and, therefore,
may not discriminate against the handicapped in violation of W.Va. Code,
5-11-9(f), as amended.
' 71
In Chico Dairy Co., Store No. 22 v. West Virginia Human Rights
Commission,6 Justice McHugh was concerned with the procedure used by the
Human Rights Commission to define a statutory term. The court held:
The rule of the West Virginia Human Rights Commission, 6
W.Va. Code of State Rules § 77-1-2.7 (1982), defining a
"handicapped person," for purposes of the West Virginia Human
Rights Act, to include a person who does not in fact have a
756 Id. at Syl.
757 309 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va. 1983).
758 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
759 385 S.E.2d 637 (W. Va. 1989).
760 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
761 382 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1989).
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"handicap," as defined by W.Va. Code, 5-11-3(t), as amended,
but who "is regarded as having such a handicap," is invalid. That
rule is a "legislative rule" under W.Va. Code, 29A-1-2(d), as
amended, but was not submitted to the legislative rule-making
review committee for its approval, as required by W.Va. Code,
29A-3-9 to 29A-3-14, as amended.762
Justice McHugh ruled in Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co. 763 that
"[a] person at any stage of infection with the human immunodeficiency virus,
including a person who has tested positive for the antibodies to such virus but who
is asymptomatic, is a person with a 'handicap' within the meaning of W. Va. Code,
5-11-3(t) [1981]. '' 764
Justice McHugh said in Dobson v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp.765 that
"[i]n a case brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W.Va. Code,
5-11-1, et seq., an offer of reinstatement that is subject to the passing of a physical
examination is not an 'unconditional' offer of reinstatement.
766
Justice McHugh stated in Woodall v. International Brothers of Electric
Workers, Local 596767 that
[p]ursuant to the West Virginia Human Rights Act, set forth in
W.Va. Code, 5-11-1 et seq., a labor organization is liable for
unlawful discriminatory practices in its capacity as an employer
only if it meets the definition of employer set forth in W. Va. Code,
5-11-3(d) [1981] because W.Va. Code, 5-11-9(c) [1981] only
applies to a labor organization's representative capacity which
involves its dealings with employers and union members.768
Justice McHugh also held that
[p]ursuant to W.Va. Code, 5-11-3(e) [1981] officers and directors
of a corporation are not employees for jurisdictional purposes
under the West Virginia Human Rights Act unless they have
additional duties which qualify them as employees outside of their
762 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
763 390 S.E.2d 814 (W. Va. 1990).
764 Id. at Syl.
765 422 S.E.2d 494 (W. Va. 1992).
766 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
767 453 S.E.2d 656 (W. Va. 1994).
768 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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duties as officers and directors. 769
In Williamson v. Greene,770 Justice McHugh held that
[p]ursuant to W.Va. Code 5-11-3(d) [1994] of the West Virginia
Human Rights Act, the term "employer" means the state, or any
political subdivision thereof, and any person employing twelve or
more persons within the state: Provided, That such terms shall not
be taken, understood or construed to include a private club. To be
an "employer" under W.Va. Code, 5-11-3(d) [1994], a person
must have been employing twelve or more persons within the state
at the time the acts giving rise to the alleged unlawful
discriminatory practice were committed.77'
E. Employment Discrimination Based on Handicap
Justice McHugh outlined the burden of proof in cases alleging handicap
discrimination in employment discharge, in the case of Morris Memorial
Convalescent Nursing Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission.772
Justice McHugh held that
[i]n order to establish a case of discriminatory discharge under
W.Va. Code, 5-11-9 [1989], with regard to employment because
of a handicap, the complainant must prove as a prima facie case
that (1) he or she meets the definition of "handicapped," (2) he or
she is a "qualified handicapped person," and (3) he or she was
discharged from his or her job. The burden then shifts to the
employer to rebut the complainant's prima facie case by
presenting a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for such person's
discharge. If the employer meets this burden, the complainant
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employer's proffered reason was not a legitimate reason but a
pretext for the discharge.773
In Hosaflook v. Consolidation Coal Co.,77 4 Justice McHugh held that
[i]n order to establish a prima facie case of handicap
769 Id at Syl. Pt. 3.
770 490 S.E.2d 23 (W. Va. 1997).
771 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
772 431 S.E.2d 353 (W. Va. 1993).
773 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
774 497 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 1997).
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discrimination pursuant to W.Va. Code, 5-11-9 [1992] of the West
Virginia Human Rights Act, which provides that it is unlawful
"[f]or any employer to discriminate against an individual with
respect to compensation, hire, tenure, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment if the individual is able and competent
to perform the services required even if such individual is ...
handicapped[,]" a claimant must prove, inter alia, that he or she is
a "qualified handicapped person" as that term is defined in 77
C.S.R. § 1-4.2 [1991]. 77 C.S.R. § 1-4.2 [1991] defines "qualified
handicapped person" as "an individual who is able and
competent, with reasonable accommodation, to perform the
essential functions of the job in question." Furthermore, 77 C.S.R.
§ 1-4.3 [1991] defines "able and competent" as "capable of
performing the work and can do the work[.]" An individual who
can no longer perform the essential functions of a job either with
or without reasonable accommodation and, thus, who is receiving
benefits under a salary continuance plan which does not provide
otherwise, is not performing the essential functions of a job by
being a benefit recipient. Therefore, that person is not a "qualified
handicapped person" within the meaning of the West Virginia
Human Rights Act.
775
F. Discrimination Based on Mental Impairment
Justice McHugh addressed the issue of employment discrimination against
the mentally ill in the case of State ex rel. Ash v. Randall.776 The opinion held
initially that "W.Va. Code, 27-5-9(a) [1977], provides, inter alia, that '[n]o person
shall be deprived of any civil right solely by reason of his receipt of services for
mental illness."'77 Justice McHugh then ruled that
[w]here an employee has been discharged from employment in
violation of the provisions of W.Va. Code, 27-5-9(a) [1977],
"solely by reason of his receipt of services for mental illness,"
that employee in contesting the discharge must nevertheless
establish under Hurley v. Allied Chemical Corporation, 164
W.Va. 757, 262 S.E.2d 757 (1980), that he or she is "otherwise
qualified" for that employment, which means that the mental
illness would not impair his or her ability to perform the duties of
that employment.
778
775 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6 (alterations in original).
776 301 S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1983).
777 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
778 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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G. Discrimination Based on Pregnancy
Justice McHugh addressed the issue of employment discrimination against
a pregnant female employee in the case of Frank's Shoe Store v. West Virginia
Human Rights Commission.779 The opinion held at the outset that "[d]iscrimination
based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under the West
Virginia Human Rights Act, W.Va. Code, 5-11-9(a) [1981]. " 78o Justice McHugh
wrote next that "[w]hen a pregnant employee who capably performs her duties
experiences a reduction in work hours, solely because of her pregnant condition,
such action by the employer constitutes illegal discrimination based upon the
employee's sex and is violative of W.Va. Code, 5-11-9(a) [1981].,,781 The decision
then outlined the elements of a plaintiff's burden of proof on a claim of retaliatory
discharge under the Human Rights Act:
In an action to redress an unlawful retaliatory discharge under the
West Virginia Human Rights Act, W.Va. Code, 5-11-1, et seq., as
amended, the burden is upon the complainant to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence (1) that the complainant engaged in
protected activity, (2) that complainant's employer was aware of
the protected activities, (3) that complainant was subsequently
discharged and (absent other evidence tending to establish a
retaliatory motivation) (4) that complainant's discharge followed
his or her protected activities within such period of time that the
court can infer retaliatory motivation.782
Justice McHugh concluded the opinion by holding that "[a]n award of
back pay is proper in a case where an employer has violated W.Va. Code, 5-11-9(a)
[1981], by reducing work hours for discriminatory reasons of a pregnant employee
and ultimately discharging her in retaliation for her involvement in protected
activities. ' ' 783
H. Discrimination Based on Age
Justice McHugh addressed the use of statistical evidence to prove age
discrimination in Dobson v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp.7M The decision held
that
779 365 S.E.2d 251 (W. Va. 1986).
780 IMt at Syl. Pt. 2.
781 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
782 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
783 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
784 422 S.E.2d 494 (W. Va. 1992).
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[s]tatistical evidence may be employed by a plaintiff in proving a
claim of age discrimination in employment under the West
Virginia Human Rights Act, W.Va. Code, 5-11-1, et seq. Under
Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence it is not an abuse
of discretion for the circuit court to allow the use of such
statistical evidence if the defendant has the opportunity to rebut
the same.785
L. Sexual Harassment
Justice McHugh outlined the burden of proof on a claim of sexual
harassment in the case of Westmoreland Coal Co. v. West Virginia Human Rights
Commission.786 The court held:
In order to prove "quid pro quo" sexual harassment at the
workplace, the complainant must prove: (1) that the complainant
belongs to a protected class; (2) that the complainant was subject
to an unwelcome sexual advance by an employer, or an agent of
the employer who appears to have the authority to influence vital
job decisions; and (3) the complainant's reaction to the
advancement was expressly or impliedly linked by the employer
or the employer's agent to tangible aspects of employment.787
Justice McHugh also held that "[tihe fact that sex-related conduct was
'voluntary,' in the sense that the complainant was not forced to participate against
her will, is not a defense to a sexual harassment suit."
788
J. Discrimination Based on Hearing Impairment
Justice McHugh held in Board of Education of County of Lewis v. West
Virginia Human Rights Commission789 that
[h]earing-impaired children, between five and twenty-three years
of age, are handicapped for purposes of W.Va. Code, 18-20-1, as
amended. Therefore, when a county board of education fails to
provide an appropriate education for a hearing-impaired child
between five and twenty-three years of age, such failure
constitutes unlawful discrimination based upon handicap and is
785 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
786 382 S.E.2d 562 (W. Va. 1989).
787 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
788 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
789 385 S.E.2d 637 (W. Va. 1989).
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violative of W.Va. Code, 5-11-9(f), as amended. 90
K. Lawful Discrimination
Justice McHugh made a distinction in Chico Dairy Co., Store No. 22 v.
West Virginia Human Rights Commission79 between employment discrimination
practices that are unlawful and employment discrimination practices that are not
prohibited by law. The court held that
[i]t is an unlawful discriminatory practice under the West Virginia
Human Rights Act for an employer to refuse to offer a job
promotion to an employee on account of the person's "handicap,"
as defined by W.Va. Code § 5-11-3(t), as amended. However,
where a complainant never alleges, and the evidence does not
indicate, that the discrimination was on account of the
complainant's "handicap," as statutorily defined, but solely
because the employer regarded the complainant's physical
appearance to be unacceptable, the conduct of the employer is not
actionable under the clearly restrictive definition of "handicap"
contained in the West Virginia Human Rights Act.
792
L. Burden of Proof in Hiring Discrimination
In Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Department v. State ex rel. State of West
Virginia Human Rights Commission,793 Justice McHugh outlined the burden of
proof in cases alleging discrimination in employment hiring and access to places of
public accommodations. Justice McHugh held that
[i]n an action to redress unlawful discriminatory practices in
employment and access to "place[s] of public accommodations"
under The West Virginia Human Rights Act, as amended, W. Va.
Code, 5-11-1 et seq., the burden is upon the complainant to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of
discrimination, which burden may be carried by showing (1) that
the complainant belongs to a protected group under the statute; (2)
that he or she applied and was qualified for the position or
opening; (3) that he or she was rejected despite his or her
qualifications; and (4) that after the rejection the respondent
continued to accept the applications of similarly qualified persons.
If the complainant is successful in creating this rebuttable
790 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
791 382 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1989).
792 Id. at Syl. Pt 3.
793 309 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va. 1983).
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presumption of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the
respondent to offer some legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason
for the rejection. Should the respondent succeed in rebutting the
presumption of discrimination, then the complainant has the
opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
reasons offered by the respondent were merely a pretext for the
unlawful discrimination.9
Justice McHugh outlined the burden for setting out a prima facie case of
discriminatory discharge in State ex rel. State of West Virginia Human Rights
Commission v. Logan-Mingo Area Mental Health Agency, Inc.79 5 The opinion held
that
[a] complainant in a disparate treatment, discriminatory discharge
case brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, [W.Va.]
Code, 5-11-1, et seq., may meet the initial prima facie burden by
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) that the
complainant is a member of a group protected by the Act; (2) that
the complainant was discharged, or forced to resign, from
employment; and (3) that a nonmember of the protected group
was not disciplined, or was disciplined less severely, than the
complainant, though both engaged in similar conduct.
796
Justice McHugh elaborated on the burden of proof in employment
discrimination in the case of West Virginia Institute of Technology v. West Virginia
Human Rights Commission.79 r Justice McHugh stated that "[tihe complainant's
prima facie case of disparate-treatment employment discrimination can be rebutted
by the employer's presentation of evidence showing a legitimate and
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment-related decision in question which is
sufficient to overcome the inference of discriminatory intent."7 98 Justice McHugh
noted:
The complainant will still prevail in a disparate-treatment
employment discrimination case if the complainant shows by the
preponderance of the evidence that the facially legitimate reason
given by the employer for the employment-related decision is
794 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3 (alteration in original).
795 329 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 1985).
796 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2 (alteration in original).
797 383 S.E.2d 490 (W. Va. 1989).
798 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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merely a pretext for a discriminatory motive.7
The court shifted its focus in holding that
[u]nlawful employment discrimination in the form of
compensation disparity based upon a prohibited factor such as
race, gender, national origin, etc., is a "continuing violation," so
that there is a present violation of the antidiscrimination statute for
as long as such compensation disparity exists; that is, each
paycheck at the discriminatory rate is a separate link in a chain of
violations.8 00
Justice McHugh concluded by holding that "W.Va. Code, 5-11-10, as
amended, does not authorize a 'cap' or time limits on back pay in continuing
violation cases."801
M. Liability of State for Unlawful Discrimination
In Kerns v. Bucklew,80 2 Justice McHugh determined whether the state's
constitutional immunity from civil liability shielded the state from liability under
state and federal civil rights laws. Justice McHugh held that
[i]n addition to the overriding effect of the supremacy clause of
the Constitution of the United States (art. VI, cl. 2) upon contrary
state law, federal legislation which is expressly authorized by
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and which implements such amendment will by its
own force override contrary state constitutional or statutory law,
such as governmental immunity (W.Va. Const. art. VI, § 35),
which state law provides less protection or relief than provided by
the fourteenth amendment and its implementing legislation, such
as the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, as amended,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).803
Justice McHugh continued in Kerns by holding:
Affirmative relief, such as an award of back pay and reasonable
attorney's fees, is recoverable against the State of West Virginia
as an employer in employment discrimination cases adjudicated
799 Id at Syl. Pt. 3.
800 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
801 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
802 357 S.E.2d 750 (W. Va. 1987).
8m Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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before the West Virginia Human Rights Commission or in the
court system of this State, as well as being recoverable in actions
or proceedings in federal forums, state constitutional
governmental immunity notwithstanding. In employment
discrimination cases the federal law, which is paramount, is
intended by the fourteenth amendment and Congress to "be
vindicated at the state or local level." 804
N. Public Policy Cause of Action Against Exempt Employer
Justice McHugh determined in Williamson v. Greene8 s whether an
employer, not covered under the Human Rights Act, could nevertheless be brought
within the Act through public policy. The court held:
Even though a discharged at-will employee has no statutory claim
for retaliatory discharge under W.Va. Code, 5-11-9(7)(C) [1992]
of the West Virginia Human Rights Act because his or her former
employer was not employing twelve or more persons within the
state at the time the acts giving rise to the alleged unlawful
discriminatory practice were committed, as required by W. Va.
Code, 5-11-3(d) [1994], the discharged employee may
nevertheless maintain a common law claim for retaliatory
discharge against the employer based on alleged sex
discrimination or sexual harassment because sex discrimination
and sexual harassment in employment contravene the public
policy of this State articulated in the West Virginia Human Rights
Act, W.Va. Code, 5-11-1, et seq.
80 6
0. Damages Under Human Rights Act
Justice McHugh noted in Dobson v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp.80 7 that
"[w]here a plaintiff, as an alternative to filing a complaint with the Human Rights
Commission, has initiated an action in circuit court to enforce the West Virginia
Human Rights Act, W.Va. Code, 5-11-1, et seq., then he or she may recover
damages sounding in tort.
'" 808
804 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
805 490 S.E.2d 23 (W. Va. 1997).
806 Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.
807 422 S.E.2d 494 (W. Va. 1992).
808 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
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